Sugar in Zambia: keeping prices down and creating more jobs
CUTS International Programmes Officer Faith Mwamba pictures by Ashton Kelly Bunda, Pan African Radio 105.1FM and Zambian Developmental Media Alliance (ZADEMA)
CUTS International Programmes Officer Faith Mwamba and Board Member Yusuf Dodia pictures by Ashton Kelly Bunda Pan African Radio 105.1FM and Zambian Developmental Media Alliance (ZADEMA)
CUTS International Board Member Yusuf Dodia pictures by Ashton Kelly Bunda Pan African Radio 105.1FM and Zambian Developmental Media Alliance (ZADEMA)
CUTS International Board Member Yusuf Dodia pictures by Ashton Kelly Bunda
Executive Summary
CUTS
Lusaka has carried out a review of the sugar sector in Zambia. Our overall
conclusion is that Zambia has the potential to attract investment from new
sugar producers in the sector, which would support job creation and increase
competition. This, overtime, would lead to a reduction in sugar prices for
consumers.
The Opportunity
Zambia
has immense potential to attract investment from new sugar producers in the
sector, which would support job creation and increase competition, this,
overtime, would lead to a reduction in sugar prices for consumers. This is
because over 95% of inputs used in the production process for sugar can be locally
sourced thereby making Zambian produced Sugar cheaper and more competitive on
the export market.
We know that there has been some
level of interest shown by investors to enter the market, however, we cannot
explain why this has not happened. Investment by new producers would be good
for the Zambian economy because it will support government’s policy, which was reiterated
in the recent 2016 Budget, of diversifying the economy towards the agriculture
sector, which would further reduce the country’s dependency on foreign currency
inflow from one sector, i.e mining.
Policy Options
We
recognise that there are existing tax incentives provided by government in the
agriculture sector. However, CUTS is of the view that more can be done for
government to focus on attracting investment in the sugar sector. Government,
through the different ministries (Trade, Finance and Agriculture), need provide
to new incentives to new entrants and those operating at a smaller scale so
that expansion in guaranteed.
In
addition, CUTS feels that the fortification policy – whereby all sugar sold for
household use in Zambia must be fortified with Vitamin A– is a barrier to
investment and investors have been unable to infiltrate the market, as entrants
in the market may need to invest in fortification equipment. However if the fortification
policy is removed, this could put Zambian jobs at risk, as it would allow for
easier imports. This trend is already seen in the border towns where sugar is
smuggled into the country. If fortification is not required, CUTS argues that
imports should then be controlled, perhaps through import tariffs. This it is
hoped would protect jobs and make the importation of Sugar less lucrative.
Case
against open boarder policy
CUTS considered the
case for opening up the Zambian market to full international competition. However, we rejected this for two main
reasons: First, the potential impact on jobs and exports. Second, the fact that prices of Sugar, while
still too high, do not appear to be as excessively high as previously
thought. The chart below shows how
Zambian sugar prices, in US$, are not unusually high by regional standards.
Regional Price Trends
of Household Sugar per 1 Kg
Lower Prices over time
While
prices are not as excessively high as previously thought, sugar prices should
be lower. Two pieces of evidence support this case:
§ Zambia
is a low cost producer and there is no reason why sugar prices should be
similar (in US$ terms) to a country like Botswana that imports Sugar. On-farm
sugar productivity is high in Zambia. A 2010 report gave figures of
15.3 ERC tonnes per hectare for Zambia, compared with 5 tonnes per ha in
Vietnam, 3.3 in Kenya and 1.4 in Bangladesh.
These productivity figures are confirmed by our own investigations,
where commercial farm achieved 15.2 tonnes per hectare last season. Therefore
as indicated it is not surprising that the cost of producing ERC sugar is lower
in Zambia. The same paper reports costs of $US 169 per tonne in Zambia versus a
World average of $US 263 (or just 64 percent of the World average cost). This
makes it a very lucrative business.
§ In
addition, new evidence and evidence in this report makes comparisons between
Zambia Sugar and Kasama Sugar. This supports the possibility that the former
charges up to ZMW1 more per 1 Kg bag of unrefined household sugar than it might
if competition was stronger, as Kasama sugar is a smaller producer than Zambia
sugar who enjoys large economies of scale.
If
CUTS’ recommendations to attract more investment into the sector where adopted
then this would reduce prices overtime. Competition, not only from existing
players, but also from new players is required in the sector if consumer
satisfaction and product diversification is to be guaranteed. More competition
will ensure that only the firms that work to innovate but also become more
efficient and better value, thereby the Zambian consumer will benefit.
Introduction
A scoping study undertaken by CUTS
International questioning the price of sugar in Zambia showed that in mid-2014
Zambian Sugar was expensive as compared to the other neighbouring countries
within the Southern African region.[1]
This was in spite of Zambia producing all its own sugar, as well as being a net
exporter and having high on-farm productivity figures. Some reports reviewed suggest that Zambia is ranked as one of the lowest
cost producers of sugar in the world. The prices of
sugar in Zambia had a previous history of being high and this was shown in
several studies over the past years that have been carried out to assess
whether there is any economic explanation behind the high prices of sugar. This
observation is also shared by Ellis,
Singh and Musonda (2010)[2] who
further show the retail price of sugar in Zambia ($/kg) is about 1.2 for
Zambia, 1.05 for Kenya, 0.99 for Ghana, 0.66 for Vietnam and 0.57 for
Bangladesh, making Zambia sugar the most expensive. They also showed that
Zambia had one of the lowest sugar production costs in the world, at $169 per
ton, when the world average was about $263 per ton. The same report also showed
that Zambia was an efficient sugar producer compared to other countries, with
the average sugar production (tonnes per hectare) being about 15.3 in Zambia, 5
in Vietnam, 3.3 in Kenya and 1.4 in Bangladesh. Chisanga (2012) further
explains that domestic prices of sugar in Zambia were also very volatile, which
can be attributed to the high correlation between the price of sugar and some
economic fundamentals such as inflation, exchange rates and high cost of
inputs.
On the export
side, another study by Kalinda and Chisanga (2014)[3] explains that Zambia was
also a net exporter of sugar, as more of the output is consumed by the external
market than the domestic market. About 60% of the sugar produced in Zambia is
exported while 40% is sold in the domestic market and about 75% of the
domestically sold sugar[4] is
sold directly to consumers while about 25% is sold to the industrial sector for
the manufacture of foodstuffs and beverages
Many
of these studies have inferred that Zambia Sugar, being a dominant player in
the market, was abusing its dominant share, by setting prices abnormally high, an
allegation which has been highly contested by Zambia Sugar. Today, however, sugar
prices are about average compared with other regional economies, as shown in
the graph on the next page. For the
reasons given above, not least the low production costs, lower sugar prices
should be a policy objective for the Zambian government. However, given that prices are not excessive
compared with the wider region, lower prices should not be on the only policy
goal. A key goal of this study was to look into how to achieve reduced sugar
prices while also protecting and increasing employment in the sugar
sector.
Regional
Price Trends of Household Sugar per 1 Kg[5]
Source: Knoema Website[6]
Sugar prices and the market structure in Zambia
Several
concerns have been raised about the market structure as well as the prices of
sugar in the market, which saw the sector being the subject of discussion and
research over the past years. Indications on the ground are that sugar prices
are high for both consumers and some sugar using industries (downstream users).
There were also concerns about the market structure, which is highly
concentrated with one dominant player. Allegations have been raised on the possibility
of the high prices being a reflection of the lack of competition in the sector.
When prices were high, it was common to suppose this was caused by excessive
pricing of sugar by Zambia Sugar. This
was thought to be the reason for the high prices because Zambia Sugar (ZS) has
a dominant share of the market, accounting for over 92 percent of what is sold
domestically, and it is to some extent protected from external competition
owing to the requirement that sugar be fortified with vitamin “A”. Then the questions ensued. Does this mean
then that ZS is able to charge high prices owing to import restrictions?
However no real evidence to support this reason has been found.
So
CUTS asked the questions: why are sugar prices high; was it due to high transport
cost; was it due to the cost of fortification; was it due to recent capital
investments by market players that had pushed the costs up; or was it due to the
artificially high exchange rates which had made the shelf-price look high when
compared internationally in US dollar prices with other countries in the
region. Depending upon the reason, the study sought to find out what, if
anything, should be done about it?
Key Ensuing Findings
On costs of production
Historic
studies show low pre-refinement production costs, and none of the information
collected by CUTS contradicts this conclusion. Sugar cane is grown in company
plantations, and by both commercial and smaller contract farmers and then
processed into sugar. Sugar cane is sold
at prices for Estimated Recoverable Crystals (ERCs) – a measure that describes
the raw sugar content of sugar cane. Some cane is of a higher quality than
others, and therefore produces more ERCs per tonne, and this is why the ERC
measure is used for purchases. On-farm sugar productivity is high in Zambia. A 2010
report[7] gave
figures of 15.3 ERC tonnes per hectare for Zambia, compared with 5 tonnes per
ha in Vietnam, 3.3 in Kenya and 1.4 in Bangladesh. These productivity figures are confirmed by
our own investigations, whereas commercial farm achieved 15.2 tonnes per
hectare last season. Therefore it is not
surprising that the cost of producing ERC sugar is lower in Zambia. The same
paper reports costs of $US 169 per tonne in Zambia versus a World average of
$US 263 (or just 64 percent of the World average cost).
The
CUTS main report contains information about actual farm production costs for a
variety of producers. These are then compared with the selling prices. The
price paid by the refinery per tonne of ERC to a commercial farm in 2014 was
ZMW 2,056. It is important to note at this point that prices vary slightly. One
Irrigation Scheme received ZMW 2,100, while an Association received only ZMW
1,900. Productivity, costs and margins vary between sugar cane producers, but
our assessment indicates a common margin of about 13 percent to cane producers.
In summary the average input cost of sugar is about ZMW 2,000 per ERC ton.
While the margin made by cane farmers does not seem to be excessive, there is
no reason here to suppose that high shelf prices are caused by farmers. This is
rested.
Costs with the Factory (Production costs)
Since
none of the sugar companies provided the production cost of sugarcane on their
estates, we cannot provide a division between production costs and the profit
margins added when selling the finished product. What we can say is that the cost of
fortification appears to be extremely low. A 2006 study put the cost at 3 Ngwee
per KG, and one sugar company said the cost of fortification to them is currently
5 Ngwee per Kg. Allowing for inflation, these figures are similar. In summary
the cost of fortifying sugar in Zambia is not responsible for the apparent
higher prices charged here than in neighbouring countries. The study was unable
to identify refining costs, however, comparisons between Zambia Sugar and
Kasama Sugar support the possibility that the former charges up to ZMW1 more
per 1 Kg bag of unrefined household sugar than it might if competition in the
sector was stronger.
Pricing by Sugar Producers
Pricing
of sugar varies and there is some level of price competition among players.
Kasama prices its sugar around ZMW 5.50 while a 1 kg ZS is pegged at ZMW 6.80 per
1 kg.
Going
by this, it is clear that ZS may be pricing higher for its sugar, but probably
by about or less than ZMW1 per Kg. Also, evidence suggests that prices are
actually negotiated between the sugar producing companies and
suppliers/wholesalers and the level of bargaining power and quantities being
bought has a huge influence on the prices. The larger buyers use bulk purchases
and their retail clout to push prices down. For example, it is evident that ZS
does try to even out prices across the country, not adding transport costs
according to location.
Wholesale, Retail and Transport
Wholesalers
and retailers play a critical role in the sugar value chain and thus this study
also paid particular attention to this issue. In the case of ZS, most of its
unrefined household sugar is sold either to wholesalers or direct to retailers,
in most cases through regional depots, inclusive of transport costs and
inclusive of VAT. Therefore the cost of transport, loading and off-loading is
included in the price charged. When
retailers in Livingstone were asked to share the price they paid for 1 kg of white
sugar from ZS’s depots there, the responses ranged from ZMW 7.00 to ZMW 7.95
(an average of about ZMW7.50) and in Chipata from as low as ZMW5 up to ZMW7.76
(an average of ZMW6.38). In Lusaka, the average was about ZMW7.10. Surprisingly,
the price for the same kilograms is higher in Monze about ZMW8.10. Monze is
about 60 kilometres from Mazabuka and thus it is expected that the price would
be lower. The former is the locality where production and milling happens while
Monze is 60 kilometres as already indicated[8].
While it is somewhat surprising that places further from the point of
production do seem to attract a slightly lower price, there is no consistent
pattern. In fact it is probable that variations in selling price have more to
do with the bargaining power of the purchaser and the quantities or bulk in
which they purchase. While in our study we have made an effort to disaggregate
for sizes of bales or packets in which sugar is sold, this is quite complicated
to achieve, and these factors may also contribute to the variations
observed.
Meanwhile
these figures provide some evidence that ZS seeks to spread the cost of
transport across the Zambian market, rather than simply charging more for sugar
the further you go from the point of sale in Mazabuka. This could also be recognition
of the need for retailers near the border to compete with a certain amount of
illegally imported sugar. The mark-ups on sugar
prices by wholesalers and retailers vary widely, but on average are reasonable.
Some retailers use sugar as a basic attraction and make little profit.
Transport costs
Interestingly,
the study showed that per KG of sugar and costs are spread across the country
and these are minimal. Although it is not advertised in the wholesale price, it
is possible to make some estimate of the size of the transport component in
total sale price. For example, there are some companies that buy sugar from ZS in
Mazabuka and transport to other places themselves. ZS sells unrefined household
sugar to a trading agent at an average of ZMW7 per Kg in Mazabuka. Note this is
a bit below the average reported above, but this information is from a ZS
licensed agent.
The
transport cost from Mazabuka to Lusaka, according interviewed licenced trading
agents with ZS is 9 Ngwee per Kg. This includes Mazabuka to wholesale
warehouse, including loading and unloading, but not transfer to retailer, which
is an extra 4 Ngwee. Therefore, the cost of the sugar plus transport to
wholesale warehouse in Lusaka is ZMW7.09 per Kg or ZMW7.13 per Kg to point of
sale to retailer. The interviewed agent disclosed that there is an additional
mark-up of 3 percent on turnover, which would bring the price charged to ZMW7.34.
However, when comparing the prices which retailers said in March 2015 at the
time of the study, they paid to the trading agent for supplies, it is apparent
that on average there is an additional 11 percent mark-up on turnover, based on
a charge of approximately ZMW7.92 per Kg. If these figures are accurate, this
represents a margin of 79 Ngwee for a transporting, handling and wholesale
agent, which is a margin on costs of 600 percent.
However,
what we may discern from this information is that the true cost of transport,
without including profit, from factory to wholesale warehouse, is approximately
6 Ngwee per Kg per 100 km. As mentioned, Mazabuka to Lusaka is approximately
150 Km, and this costs 9 Ngwee. Lusaka to Chipata is about 500 Km, so on a
purely pro-rata basis, transport costs from Mazabuka to Chipata may be
approximately 40 Ngwee per Kg. Costs to the Copperbelt would be around 35 Ngwee
per Kg.
In
summary, average transport costs around the country from Mazabuka may be in the
range of 30 Ngwee per KG. This may contribute to greater prices than in other
regional countries with lower transport costs (not including transporters’
margins) but it cannot be the cause of all of the difference.
A New factor
The
graph at the beginning reveals that there were possible additional causes to
the previous high prices. While costs of sugar cane production may be low owing
to high productivity, actual costs such as labour time may have been relatively
high owing to inflated exchange rates. Past exchange rates may have been
unreasonably high owing to buoyant copper sales. But since these declined the value
of the Kwacha may now be more realistic. Kindly note, It’s the rate of change
that is a problem, not the rate as such. The price of sugar on the shelf, if it
remains relatively stable in Kwacha terms, which owing to its high local content in costs
it may do, is now quite close to the
average.
In
summary, sugar prices on the shelf may have been distorted owing to slight
over-pricing, facilitated by a lack of competition. But the decline in the
exchange rate (which reduces relative costs) means prices are now more
comparable regionally.
ZS’s Export Markets
While
the entire production for Kasama Sugar and Kafue Sugar only caters for domestic
market, ZS produces only 40 percent of its product for the domestic market, of
which 60 percent goes for export. The sugar exported is not directly comparable
with household sugar because it’s refined sugar which is a different product
from unrefined sugar that consumed locally. However, the international sugar
market is currently extremely competitive and Sugar prices have fallen from as
high as 17 cents per pound(Lb)[9]
in early November 2014, it was only just over 10 cents per pound(Lb) by late
August 2015, this is shown below..
World Sugar Prices US Cents per Lb
Source:
Trading Economics[10]
ZS, being the only exporter, is therefore, already
under extreme pressure on its sugar exports – though the fall in the Kwacha has
great benefits to the company. Also the EU quota system is about to change,
which will expose ZS to other world producers. Brazil produces 23 % of World
sugar and sells cheaply and this provides competition for the European market.
However, over 95% of the costs of production for sugar producers are locally
sourced and the fall of the Kwacha should cushion the pressure against exports especially
for ZS being the only exporter. This
means that the performance of the exchange rate that has negatively affected
the kwacha, makes the sugar export market a more lucrative business, this is
illustrated in the table below.
ZS
Annual Profits from export market [11]
Annual
profit in USD for the 2013/2014 financial year
|
Annual
profit ZMW at the rate[12]
of $ 6.10 as of 31 March 2014 for the 2013/2014 financial year
|
Annual
profit ZMW at the rate of $ 12.30 as of
02 October 2015 for the 2013/2014 financial year
|
143,001,475.41
|
872,309,000.00
|
1,758,918,147.53
|
Annual
profit in USD for the 2014/2015
financial year
|
Annual
profit ZMW at the rate of $ 7.60 as of 31 March 2015 for the 2014/2015 financial year
|
Annual
profit ZMW at the rate of $ 12.30 as of 02 October 2015 for the 2014/2015 financial year
|
117,697,894.74
|
894,504,000.00
|
1,447,684,105.30
|
In
conclusion, ZS should be using such opportunities to subsidies domestic prices
to cushion the poor on domestic prices and nonetheless sustain over 5,600 jobs
in Zambia. In addition there is also a
opportunity for the Zambian government to attract investment from new sugar
producers into the market.
Policy Options: The Need for Competition?
Is
there a need to introduce more competition into the Zambian Sugar market? The
answer is outright yes. This could help to ensure that prices remain
competitive. The process of economic rivalry between market players to attract
customers is almost non-existent in the market. The need for a competitive
situation where market contestability and competition comes not only from
existing players, but also from new players is required in the sector if
consumer satisfaction and product diversification is to be guaranteed. More
competition will be a force which will ensure that only the firms that work
hard innovate and respond to market dynamics will become more efficient and
offer a greater choice of products at lower prices because of the fear that
only the efficient ones will survive in the market. This ensures best possible
utilisation of available resources. But how do we ensure that competition
ensues. There are two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, options available;
1) Open
the market to imports by dropping the vitamin A fortification requirement. But
this has to be driven through a quota system;
or
2) Facilitate
investment in domestic sugar production
If option 2
was to go by, government through the different ministries (Trade, Finance and
Agriculture) need to walk the talk in providing new incentives to new entrants
and those operating at a smaller scale so that expansion in guaranteed. This
will also require transparency in the management and oversight of the sector.
Addressing vested interest among government officials in the sector still is
also highly required. Those serving in government positions should not be
allowed to seat on any platforms of the different companies operating in the
sector unless interest is declared.
Policy Options 1: Dropping Import Controls?
Could
allowing of sugar imports in the country bring sugar prices down? But evidently
from the regional graph, this will not be by much. It
has been argued in the past that entry to the market in Zambia has been
prevented by the requirement to fortify with vitamin “A”. This, it is
suggested, prevents imports and protects ZS from competition. This
“policy” may be viewed as a protection mechanism for local players’ profits,
but equally for Zambian jobs. However, the efficacy of the fortifications
process is questionable as Vitamin A deficiency levels are still high standing
at 53%[13].
If
opening to imports was successful, it could, however undermine the sugar
industry’s profitability and lead to reduced production volumes and loss of
jobs. Therefore, a quota importation system could be permitted to allow for
specified quantities of imports that would steer competition in the market, or
introducing some sort of import tariff to make importation less lucrative . Jobs could only be undermined if the
current players in the market decide to remain fatigued. The jobs debated ought
to be looked at broadly. For example, industrial sugar is an input to many
downstream market players which, if aggregated, employs more than two times the
estimated 5 600[14]
jobs the sugar industry creates. Therefore, facilitating the growth of
downstream industries is highly required and flexibility on the availability of
options ought to be provided.
Policy Options 2: Facilitating Investment?
A
second policy options would be for Zambia to facilitate investment in the
sector, as this would bring jobs to Zambia. During
this study CUTS learned through interviews with a sugar producer that there is
actually a fourth sugar producer which is a recent entrant in the market but is
yet to start production.
This
latter report should be considered with some caution; as such stories of
investment in sugar production have circulated before, but have not come to
fruition. However, the fact that it is being reported at some stage of
development may indicate that the market may not be as closed as some suggest.
Certainly if the Government wanted to adopt a market-orientated approach
(rather than an interventionist one) to reducing sugar prices, encouraging or
facilitating this kind of investment could be recommended. With current
devaluation in the Kwacha, and the preponderance of local costs in sugar
production, Zambia is now a cheaper place in which to produce for export than
it was. If two more companies entered the market with the same or near the
capacity of ZS, they would produce approximately about four times the jobs. One
the other hand, more investment will yield competition – a remedy towards
reducing the prices further.
In
addition, CUTS feels that the fortification policy – whereby all sugar sold for
household use in Zambia must be fortified with Vitamin A– is a barrier to
investment and investors have been unable to infiltrate the market, as entrants
in the market may need to invest in fortification equipment. However if the
fortification policy is removed, this could put Zambian jobs at risk, as it
would allow for easier imports.
Conclusion
Sugar
is an important product for both household and sugar consuming industries. This
is perhaps the reason why there is a great level of concentration among
researchers and interest groups on the sector. The undertone in all research
papers is a mere contribution towards finding a lasting solution to the
increasing sugar prices. Most papers
carried on the sector have highlighted the secretive nature of the sector and
that critical information is not easily divulged. This is attested by CUTS, where an Industry
player could not commit to giving critical information without entering in to a
non-disclosure agreement. The mystery in this equation still brews speculation
and further interest on the sector. However,
despite these factors, the CUTS paper was able to bring out key substantive
information on the dynamics of the sector and a summery presentation of the key
conclusions include;
- Our
assessment indicates that the margin made by cane farmers does not seem to
be excessive and therefore, there is no reason here to suppose that high
shelf prices are caused by farmers.
- The
cost of fortification appears to be extremely low, with one Sugar Company
saying the cost of fortification to them is currently 5 Ngwee per Kg.
Therefore, the cost of fortifying sugar in Zambia is not responsible for
the apparent higher prices charged.
- The
study was unable to identify refining costs, however, comparisons between
Zambia Sugar and Kasama Sugar support the possibility that the former
charges up to ZMW1 more per 1 Kg bag of unrefined household sugar than it
might if competition in the sector was stronger.
- Pricing
of sugar varies and there is some level of price competition among
players. Kasama prices its sugar around ZMW 5.50 while a 1 kg ZS is pegged
at ZMW 6.80 per 1 kg.
- Prices
are actually negotiated between the sugar producing companies and
suppliers/wholesalers and the level of bargaining power and quantities
being bought has a huge influence on the prices. The larger buyers use
bulk purchases and their retail clout to push prices down.
- Average
transport costs around the country from Mazabuka may be in the range of 30
Ngwee per KG. This may contribute to greater prices than in other regional
countries with lower transport costs (not including transporters’ margins)
but it cannot be the cause of all of the difference.
- Over
95% of the costs of production for sugar producers are locally sourced and
the devaluation of the Kwacha, we assume, should cushion the pressure
against exports that ZS, being the only exporter, feels with the drop of
the world sugar prices on the export market. This means that the performance of the
exchange rate that has negatively affected the kwacha makes the sugar
export market a more lucrative business.
[2] Ellis Karen, Singh
Rohit and Chiwama Musonda, (2010), Assessing the Economic Impact of
Competition: Findings from Zambia, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2010
[3] Kalinda Thomson and
Chisanga Brian, (2014), Sugar Value Chain in Zambia: An Assessment of the
Growth Opportunities and Challenges, Asian Journal of Agricultural Sciences
6(1): 6-15, 2014
[6]
http://knoema.com/wzisqoe/food-prices
[7] Ellis Karen, Singh
Rohit and Chiwama Musonda, (2010), Assessing the Economic Impact of
Competition: Findings from Zambia, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2010
[8] Remember these
amounts include transport, loading and off-loading
[9]Please
note that
pound (abbreviations: lb) is a unit of mass used in the imperial measurement
system.
[10] http://www.tradingeconomics.com/commodity/sugar
[12] The
exchange rate obtained from http://www.boz.zm/(S(veqmtdansiwqbvr43wu4xr45))/FinanciaMarkestReport.aspx
